Why The BJP May Not Succeed in Reviving Its Floundering Campaign in Bihar

All elections are inevitably extended narratives; and each poll, a soap opera with its fair share of theatrical twists, turns and dramatic pauses. A fortnight since the assembly elections in Bihar first began, the state seems to have shaken off the strain of the intermissions. After a forced interval for the past few days due to Navaratri, Durga Puja and Muharram, the campaigns have been revived in earnest. In ordinary circumstances, such a break in the middle of an enactment like this one would serve as the perfect opportunity for the political players involved to take stock of their position and evaluate their strategies. However, it is not possible to analyse the remedial measures taken by the two adversaries—the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance that is facing the Grand Alliance comprising the Janata Dal(U), the Rashtriya Janata Dal and the Congress—without taking a look at the campaign machinery that has provided the backdrop for these elections so far.

After polling for the second phase ended on 16 October 2015, a consensus emerged, among even sections of the NDA, that the BJP’s campaign is stuttering. Unless the party is able to make a significant change to its chal, chehra, charitra aur chintan (behaviour, character, face and ideology)—as it had attempted to in the 1990’s under the aegis of KN Govindacharya, who went on to become the party’s general secretary—the BJP’s prospects in the three phases that remain do not look very bright. More than two decades ago, when Govindacharya first furthered this cause, the BJP was looking to socially engineer itself as it tried to expand its electorate base to backward castes. This time, however, the party appears to have abandoned any attempts at introspection. It has chosen instead, to limit its relationship with the electorate to hollow sales pitches.

After the BJP’s streak of victory in elections across the country last year, arrogance was institutionalised at all levels in the party. A prevailing sense of superiority prevented the BJP from seeing that ground realities have changed—and drastically so. The party’s leaders supplemented this myopic approach by focussing all of their energies on hyping Jitin Ram Manjhi, Nitish Kumar’s erstwhile protégé, while ignoring allies such as Lok Janshakti Party President Ram Vilas Paswan and Upendra Kushwaha of the Rashtriya Lok Samata Party. This modus operandi resulted in an internal strife between Paswan and Manjhi over who represents the interests of state’s Dalits better. Tussles such as this have hampered the ability of the BJP to put up a united front, leading to a disjointed partnership in which allies are not working for each other. A senior functionary from the BJP told me that the NDA has not been able to pool its resources together, and that the BJP’s allies are “left fending for themselves.” In the Lok Sabha polls, cohesion was one of the biggest strengths of the BJP-led grouping. During these elections, the party’s inability to prevent the fragmentation of its camp has been one of its biggest shortcomings.

The third miscalculation made by the BJP leadership was its belief that the alliance forged by Kumar and Lalu Prasad Yadav would eventually result, either in a fall-out or an ineffective front.  While the Grand Alliance was an admittedly difficult proposition, the BJP’s folly was that it let this assumption serve as the underlying premise for its course of action.

There are two features in an electoral campaign that can cement or destroy a political bid. The first is political strategy, and the second, a campaign to leverage this strategy. The Grand Alliance secured a head start on both counts. The three parties determined a seat distribution formula and subsequent seat allocation on 12 August, much before the BJP and its allies did on 14 September. The Grand Alliance’s campaign managed to maintain its vigour through constant metamorphosis. Its tactic of adding new elements to the campaign every few days was reminiscent of the technique Modi used in 2014. This is probably because Prashant Kishor, one of Modi’s campaign managers in the Lok Sabha election, is now working with Kumar. On the other hand, the BJP maintained a flat and even pitch. It faltered by sticking to the same script: A big Modi rally followed by little else. Although some of the NDA’s local leaders addressed a few gatherings, these were lacklustre as the hype that surrounded Modi’s blitzkrieg rendered the apparatus both exhausted and overwhelmed

A senior official who has been working on Kumar’s campaign told me that when they began work for this election, they realised that Brand Nitish had to be re-launched. The BJP’s lieutenants, however, neglected to accept that Brand Modi’s value had considerably diminished. By the time, he entered the arena towards the end of July with the massive Parivartan Rally in Muzaffarpur, Kumar has emerged as a serious contender for power. The general impression was that Modi’s assemblies were thronged by crowds; but the enthusiasm was more a reflection of the attendees’ curiosity than it was an indication of their support for the NDA.  Meanwhile, Kumar launched Har Ghar Dastak (Knock On Every Door)—an ambitious public contact programme that aimed to reach out to one crore households—in July. Its impact may not have been huge, but it was effective in ensuring that Brand Nitish was revived despite its uneven footing in the initial stages of the elections. By the end of July, it was clear that no campaign in these elections could be driven solely through social media gimmickry. Consequently, the BJP began resorting to more traditional methods. It rolled out LCD-fitted and GPS-monitored raths for road shows. Yet, the use of technology to enable the surveillance of these vehicles is further proof of the growing distrust between the leadership and its local workers.

The division within the state unit and its failure to integrate led to a campaign that lacked coordination. Modi’s presence proved to be much more of a limitation than an asset, as he could not neutralise the absence of local faces. Last year, the strategy of not naming a chief ministerial candidate had worked to the party’s benefit in states where an anti-incumbency sentiment was rampant. But Kumar did not face the kind of resentment that governments in states such as Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Haryana had. In fact, in this case, Modi was facing the challenges of being an incumbent. Every promise he made in Bihar was weighed against the increasing gap between the assurances he had given and delivered upon in the centre.

The BJP’s failure to recalibrate its strategy and rethink the dynamics of its campaign after the Grand Alliance’s successful rally at Patna’s Gandhi Maidan was an oversight that may cost the party this election. It failed to see two major takeaways from that rally: Yadav’s emergence as a game-changer in the landscape and the ease with which he took the drift of the main electoral issue from development to social justice It was at this rally that Yadav responded to the BJP’s claim that he would usher in Jungle Raj II by saying that he would herald the advent of Mandal Raj II—a thinly veiled reference to both the omnipresence of caste politics in the state and the presence of the Congress in the alliance.

The senior official working on Kumar’s campaign told me that Yadav and Kumar were quick to realise that their alliance needed to work both as a successful vote aggregator and a campaign platform. As a result, the managers of both these leaders decided to abandon the idea of a combined rally after August. They opted instead, to hold separate meetings for all three parties. This decision was grounded in the assessment that Yadav’s quirky campaign may sound cacophonous for the chief minister’s more sombre supporters, and that Kumar in turn, would prove to be too “boring” for Yadav’s followers.  Even the Congress was left to work only within those constituencies in which its candidates were contesting. It was a significant risk, since separate rallies would translate into poor media coverage, but it paid off.

In 2014, the hallmark of the Modi campaign was the speed with which he reacted to his opponents. This time, he is at the receiving end of his rivals’ vigilance. The Rs 1.25 lakh crore Bihar package was pre-empted, and even before it was announced; the jahnse mein naheen aayenge (We will not fall for your ploy) pitch had been mounted by Kumar’s camp. The chief minister also interacted with the media regularly to analyse and counter Modi’s claims. In contrast, the NDA was hamstrung by the theatrical riposte from Modi.

The BJP realised that its plan was getting undone only after polling for the first phase ended on 12 October. It hastily brought in other central leaders such as Sushma Swaraj, the minister of external affairs, to address public meetings. But by then the damage had already been done. In 2014, Modi’s victory was declared as inevitable much before the votes were counted. His campaign managers had succeeded in introducing the sense that India was intoxicated on the very idea of Modi as prime minister. In January this year, the BJP took a beating from the Aam Aadmi Party in the Delhi assembly elections because it lost the battle of perception. This time, the rival camp in Bihar exudes that confidence of an easy triumph. Unless the BJP is able to devise a dramatic reversal of fortunes, its defeat appears imminent. The only question that remains is the extent of the party’s decline from its intimidating performance last year.