The Modi government’s capitulation on Agnipath cannot undo the damage it has done

On 4 November, the Narendra Modi government beat a significant retreat on Agnipath, the military recruitment scheme it had introduced four years ago in the face of opposition from the defence services. The scheme allowed for youth to be inducted into the armed forces on a contractual basis rather than a long-term enlistment. The retreat came days before three quarters of the first cohort of Agniveers—the soldiers contracted under the scheme—were due to be released. Under the new arrangement, the 75 percent of Agniveers not selected for retention after their initial four-year term will be offered a two-year “second tour of duty.” After those extra two years, willing personnel meeting selection criteria can enrol as regular soldiers. The original 25 percent retention on merit remains, but the practical effect is a pathway toward near-full absorption for those who want it. (Subsequent media reports have added further confusion by suggesting that the revisions will apply only to those currently serving as Agniveers, and that no decision has been taken about the incoming cohorts of contractual soldiers.)

Announcing this climbdown, the chief of defence staff, NS Raja Subramani, insisted the Agnipath scheme “has not been discontinued,” but this was little more than face-saving. After all, the scheme’s defining feature was the deliberate creation of a large cohort of contractual soldiers who would exit service after four years with a cash package and no pension, no ex-serviceman status and limited prospects in civilian life. The official release attributes the U-turn to outstanding performance, positive feedback and the alignment of recruits’ aspirations with organisational efficiency. It lists fitness, motivation, technological adaptability and recruitment improvements as achievements, then declares that Agnipath will continue. But those realisations do not explain why the original four-year exit arrangement is now being substantially altered. This is nothing but an attempt at political survival and short-term management of political discontent. As has been the norm with Modi since 2014, political panic has forced a tactical retreat, while official claims try to spin the narrative surrounding it. The timing of upcoming elections in Punjab, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh is obvious.

Introduced in June 2022, after a recruitment freeze that lasted two years, Agnipath was billed as a revolutionary modernisation project that would slash the crippling defence pension bill, lower the average age of the armed forces, get more tech-savvy soldiers and infuse the citizenry with neo-nationalist discipline. Though never formally acknowledged, the main driver was fiscal. A study found that an Agniveer cost the government almost a quarter less than an average soldier. Over a period of two decades, with Agniveers expected to make up a majority of the forces, the savings would be substantial.

Having invested politically in One Rank One Pension, Modi found it difficult to mount an open assault on existing pension entitlements. Short-term recruitment offered another route to reduce future obligations by changing the terms for future soldiers. The chief of the army staff at the time, General MM Naravane, resisted a full rollout and preferred a limited pilot project but was overruled by the prime minister’s office. The scheme was imposed against the wishes of the service chiefs, and anyone who dared criticise it, whether a veteran admiral or a school-leaving aspirant, was demonised by pro-establishment voices in the media.