Pakistan’s current global prestige cannot mask its domestic decay

Pakistan recently secured a high-profile geopolitical achievement with the signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement alongside Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The trilateral pact commits the three nations—a NATO member, a wealthy Gulf monarchy and a nuclear-armed state—to a collective defence structure, framing an attack on one as an attack on all. Although its complete text and the precise obligations of the parties have not been made public, the agreement gives Pakistan diplomatic relevance beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Turkey brings military capability and defence expertise, Saudi Arabia brings financial resources and strategic heft, while Pakistan brings a large standing professional military, nuclear weapons and experience in security cooperation. The pact is largely seen as a response to instability in West Asia and uncertainty about the future American security role in the region. Quite apart from what this means for India’s political and military positioning in the neighbourhood, the implications for Pakistan’s domestic politics are grim.

Each external diplomatic win, such as this pact, works as a temporary life-support system for the military establishment. To Pakistan army chief Asim Munir, the agreement brings a renewed sense of international validation, allowing him to present Pakistan as a rising power in West and South Asia. It is a convenient distraction as the social fabric of the country disintegrates under the weight of political repression and economic collapse.

The federal internal security minister Mohsin Naqvi recently proposed dismantling Pakistan’s existing four provinces to create a larger number of smaller administrative units. Naqvi, who is seen to be aligned with the army, was soon backed by the military’s spokesperson. Another recent proposal suggested four new units in Punjab and a similar restructuring in the other provinces, while yet another associated with the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, envisages five provinces in Punjab, three in Sindh, three in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and two in Balochistan.

The public argument for many more provinces is that the system has collapsed and needs a reset. The appeal for such measures comes from a genuine governance problem. Punjab dominates the federation through its majority share in population, business, bureaucracy, political networks and military recruitment. Sindh is divided between Karachi and the rest of the province, with a persistent urban-rural conflict over representation and resources. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa combines settled districts with former tribal areas that have different histories of administration and insecurity. Balochistan remains geographically vast, sparsely populated and poorly integrated into the political economy of the federation. It can be reasonably argued that smaller provinces could improve representation and service delivery. Yet the core objective behind restructuring the provincial map is not administrative efficiency, but political engineering.