On 27 and 28 April last year, a rare “informal summit” took place between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and China’s president, Xi Jinping, at Wuhan in China. The meeting was described by the Indian and foreign media as a chance for the two countries to “reset” their fraught relationship. According to the Indian government, several outstanding issues were discussed—the dispute over the 4,056-kilometre Line of Actual Control; the trade deficit India has with China, a statistical figure going up every year; and ways to develop cultural exchange. Whether China’s occupation of Tibet—a longstanding bone of contention between the two nations—figured in their discussions is not known.
Both countries’ governments and sections of the mainstream media hailed the visit as a milestone in bilateral relations. India’s ministry of external affairs released a press statement on 28 April, stating that Xi and Modi had “agreed that proper management of the bilateral relationship will be conducive for the development and prosperity of the region, and will create the conditions for the Asian Century.” Since then, several members of the Modi government, including the minister of external affairs Sushma Swaraj, have referred to the “Wuhan consensus” or the “Wuhan spirit” to claim an improvement in Indo-China relations.
However, a year since the summit, there has been little visible movement on any of the issues supposedly discussed at Wuhan, making any claims of progress seem like hogwash. India and China have several existential conflicts between them, where any resolution would have to be marked by compromises. However, Modi’s populist domestic politics barely leaves any room for such a scenario. While Modi and his supporters keep boasting of his successes in the realm of foreign policy, the relationship with China offers a case where style can be distinguished over substance.