On 30 January 1948, Gandhi was shot dead in Delhi by Nathuram Godse.
On 3 February, four days after the assassination, Golwalkar was arrested. A day later, the RSS was banned. The government communiqué justifying the ban stated that it was imposed because “undesirable and even dangerous activities have been carried on by members of the Sangh.” The details were sinister. “It has been found that in several parts of the country individual members of the RSS have indulged in acts of violence involving arson, robbery, dacoity, and murder and have collected illicit arms and ammunition,” the notice stated. “They have been found circulating leaflets exhorting people to resort to terrorist methods, to collect firearms, to create disaffection against the government and suborn the police and the military.”
The government’s actions represented a challenge to the very existence of the RSS. But MS Golwalkar, the sarsanghchalak, maneuvered the organisation through this crisis over the next year, allowing it to eventually return to prominence. To do this, he used a combination of mobilisation—both covert and overt—public statements and arguments, and political lobbying. The deputy prime minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, seems to have played a key role in ensuring the organisation’s survival.
To begin with, a day after the ban, Golwalkar issued what sounded like a carefully phrased, almost diplomatic statement. “It has always been the policy of the RSS to be law-abiding and carry on its activities within the bounds of law,” he said. “Therefore, since the Government has declared the RSS an unlawful body it is thought advisable to disband the RSS till the ban is there, at the same time denying all the charges leveled against the organisation.”
In a book on the early years of the RSS, the writers Walter Andersen and Sridhar D Damle, wrote, “Despite this instruction and subsequent ban, a large number of swayamsevaks continued to meet together.” The book noted that while “RSS officers from all levels of the organization were arrested,” younger members “constructed and maintained the clandestine apparatus” of the organisation.
It became clear in the days that followed that, while the immediate conspiracy for the murder had been hatched by a section of the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS had played a key role in creating the atmosphere in which the crime occurred. In a letter dated 18 July 1948 to Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, a former president of the Hindu Mahasabha, Vallabhbhai Patel, who was also the home minister, wrote of the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha’s role in Gandhi’s killing, “as a result of the activities of these two bodies, particularly the former, an atmosphere was created in the country in which such a tragedy became possible. There is no doubt in my mind that the extreme section of the Hindu Mahasabha was involved in the conspiracy. The activities of the RSS constituted a clear threat to the existence of the Government and the State. Our reports show that these activities, despite the ban, have not died down.” Despite these acknowledgements of the RSS’s role in fomenting violence, the government did not find direct evidence linking any of its members to Gandhi’s assassination. As a result, most of them were released.
Golwalkar, too, was released, in August, subject to certain conditions—including that he not address public gatherings, and that he obtain government approval before publishing anything. Later that year, Patel wrote to him, expressing his concerns about the RSS’s activities. “Organising the Hindus and helping them is one thing but going in for revenge for its sufferings on innocent and helpless men, women and children is quite another thing,” he wrote. Patel also decried the RSS’s “opposition to the Congress, that too of such virulence, disregarding all considerations of personality, decency or decorum” and argued that it “created a kind of unrest among the people.”
Patel added that the Sangh’s leaders’ “speeches were full of communal poison. It was not necessary to spread poison in order to enthuse the Hindus and organize for their protection. As a final result of their poison, the country had to suffer the sacrifice of the invaluable life of Gandhiji.” Patel asserted that the government and people now opposed the RSS. “Opposition turned more severe, when the RSS men expressed joy and distributed sweets after Gandhiji’s death,” he wrote. “Under these conditions it became inevitable for the Government to take action against the RSS.” And though the government had hoped that the RSS would amend its ways, more than six months after the ban, “from the reports that come to me, it is evident that attempts to put fresh life into their same old activities are afoot.”
In October, Golwalkar’s travel restrictions were lifted. He travelled to Delhi for discussions with the government—but these were terminated without success. Golwalkar was again arrested and returned to Nagpur.
Through this period of uncertainty and confusion, Golwalkar articulated a vision for the Sangh’s future. Responding to demands from within the RSS, he said, “One more idea has been suggested that the RSS convert itself into a political party—which will mean that besides political parties nothing else, not even pious cultural works have any right to exist. This position is unbearable and does no credit to those who may hold it.” He argued that “cultural work should be entirely free from political scramble for power and should not be even tagged on to any political party. I therefore, must say that their suggestion is not in the best interests of the people.”
Golwalkar decided to challenge the ban on the RSS with a satyagraha, which was launched on 9 December in Delhi. The leader was still under arrest at the time the protest kicked off, but, according to RSS sources, it nevertheless drew 60,000 participants.
By some accounts, despite expressing wariness of the organisation, Patel was also keen on engaging closely with it. Andersen and Damle wrote that Eknath Ranade, a member of the RSS central executive who was involved in secret negotiations with the government around this time, told them that Patel “told him that Swayamsevaks should join the Congress and help build the party’s organisational base.” The authors added that RSS leaders “close to the negotiations” claimed Patel “wanted to utilize the RSS cadre to oppose some of Nehru’s policies.”
There may be some truth to these allegations. Golwalkar had written to Patel repeatedly, asking him to substantiate the claims he was making about the RSS with evidence. As deputy prime minister and home minister, Patel would have been well aware of the material Jaitley had presented to Pant, as well as the information available in the Delhi Police records. It remains unclear why he did not present this evidence to Golwalkar or make it public.
Patel’s leanings towards the RSS also became clear later that year, after the ban on the RSS had been lifted. While Nehru was abroad, the Congress voted to allow RSS members to join the party. The decision, which was backed by Patel’s supporters and opposed by Nehru’s supporters, was amended a month later, after Nehru’s return, so that individuals could only join the Congress if they gave up their membership of the RSS.
As one of the conditions for the government lifting the ban on the RSS, Golwalkar agreed to submit to the government a written constitution for the organisation. In this document, Golwalkar projected a conciliatory front. “The Sangh is aloof from politics and is devoted to social and cultural fields only,” read a key clause. “However, the Swayamsevaks are free, as individuals, to join any party, institution or front, political or otherwise, except such parties, institutions or fronts which subscribe to or believe in extra-national loyalties, or resort to violent and/or secret activities to achieve their ends, or which promote or attempt to promote, or have the object of promoting any feeling of enmity or hatred towards any other community or creed or religious denomination.” He insisted that people “owing allegiance to the above-mentioned undesirable elements and methods of working shall have no place in the Sangh.”
This is an extract from “The Instigator: How MS Golwalkar’s virulent ideology underpins Modi’s India,” by Hartosh Singh Bal, published in The Caravan’s July 2017 issue. Read the story in full here.