Khurshid Mahmud Kasuriwas the minister of foreign affairs of Pakistan from 2002 until 2007 under President Pervez Musharraf. His book Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider's Account of Pakistan's Foreign Relations, aims toprovide insights on Pakistan's foreign policy and its relationship with India amidst the backdrop of Jammu and Kashmir. On 11 October 2015, Shiv Sena activists intercepted the car of Sudheendra Kulkarni, head of the Observer Research Foundation and speechwriter for the former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was going to attend the launch of Kasuri’s book later that day. The activists smeared Kulkarni’s face with black paint to protest the launch of the book in Mumbai. Soon after, senior party officials stated that they would not compromise on the issue of Pakistanis conducting events in India.
While calling the book a “memoir” in his introduction, and not a political biography, Kasuri attempts to examine Pakistan’s evolving foreign policy during his tenure and beyond. He stresses people-to-people contacts between India and Pakistan and is convinced that “Pakistan’s existing policy could not advance or safeguard the interests of Kashmiris and Pakistan in the foreseeable future. In this section, from the chapter “The Pakistan Army and India," Kasuri recounts a meeting with US senator John McCain—and at the time, Republican presidential candidate—in which the senator asked Kasuri how Pakistan would react if there were to be a “limited air-raid” on Murdike, the Lashkar-e-Taiba headquarters built just outside Lahore.
The McCain Episode: This section is about near-war situations. The Mumbai attacks in November 2008, though truly tragic and gruesome, could not really be called a near-war situation, since neither country moved its armed forces in any menacing or hostile manner. The reason why I am including the Mumbai attacks in this section is the massive scale of the attacks, the huge number of casualties, the international dimension due to casualties belonging to different countries, and last but not the least, due to what I call, the McCain Episode, on which I shall elaborate upon. All this could have gone horribly wrong with horrendous consequences.
Fortunately, it did not, largely due to the fact that the peace process started in 2004 had advanced a great deal and helped normalize the situation between the two countries. The magnitude of the Mumbai attacks almost put paid to such efforts. There was, however, also a feeling that the new PPP government led by President Asif Ali Zardari, did in fact wish to strengthen relations with India. Additionally, of course, there were nuclear weapons on both sides.
It was a sad day indeed when the tragic attack on Mumbai took place on 26 November 2008, delivering a heavy blow to the peace process between Pakistan and India, which we had so diligently pursued. Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister in the new PPP government, who succeeded me, was present in India in connection with the Composite Dialogue when the attacks took place, in what seemed like a calculated attempt to sabotage the visit and the process itself.
I was reminded of a similar situation on the eve of my own visit to India when the Samjhauta Express blast occurred in which there were many casualties, most of whom were Pakistanis visiting their relatives in India. The accused in that instance ultimately turned out to be Hindu extremists in India. I was advised to cancel my visit after the Samjhauta Express blasts. I refused, since that would encourage terrorists by raising their morale and into believing that they had succeeded in sabotaging my visit.
As a result of the four-day siege in Mumbai, at least 160 people died and 293 were injured, many of them severely. The outrage in India was understandable. In Pakistan, sympathy for the victims was widespread. There was immediate and strong condemnation of the attacks by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani as well as by the leaders of mainstream political parties. We instantly understood that the perpetrators wished to wreck the peace process. Many incidents in Kashmir, India and Pakistan had taken place before important diplomatic visits to the subcontinent by important foreign visitors, including the ‘Chattisinghpura Massacre’ which took place on the eve of President Bill Clinton’s visit to India, and other incidents during the visits of Pakistani leaders to India or by Indian leaders to Pakistan.
This unfortunate incident had an international dimension as well. The dead and injured victims included nationals from almost twenty-five countries including those from the United States, Germany, Israel, Australia, Canada, France, and Britain. Additionally, this attack was on a totally different scale. Terrorists held Mumbai hostage for four days straight. Both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the then Opposition leader L. K. Advani, displayed great restraint, despite the pressure they were under, and did not directly implicate the Government of Pakistan. This was obviously due to the great progress that had been made in the peace process during our tenure which ended in November 2007. In a televised address Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said India would ‘go after’ individuals and organizations behind the terrorist attacks, which were ‘well-planned with external linkages …’ In addition, ‘the attacks were intended to create a sense of panic by choosing high-profile targets and indiscriminately killing of innocent foreigners’. The leader of the Opposition, L. K. Advani, asked the people of India to stay united during this emergency. He also said, ‘We will take the strongest possible measures to ensure that there is no repetition of such terrorist acts.’
Now I come to the McCain Episode. I had ceased being Pakistan’s Foreign Minister in November 2007. Almost a year later, I received a message in Lahore, where I live, from the office of the Principal Officer of the US Consulate that Senator John McCain, who had remained in the headlines all over the world for many months as the Republican Presidential Candidate for the upcoming 2008 elections, was visiting Lahore. I knew that Senator McCain was a highly regarded individual in the US and outside. I was told to come a bit early because he and other members of the delegation wished to discuss something with me and that he would be accompanied by Senator Lindsey Graham, a senior and influential Republican Senator who has been a Ranking Member as well as a Member of many committees of the US Senate. At that time he was Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence. I was also informed that the two Senators will be accompanied by Richard Holbrooke, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. It almost gave the impression of being a bipartisan delegation since Holbrooke was a supporter of the Democratic Party and had been nominated to his office by President Barack Obama and was considered to be very close to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
My experience told me that this was as high-powered a delegation as it could be. I was informed that it would be a small and quiet lunch and I instinctively understood that there must be something important that they wished to discuss with me. I have a vague memory that I saw a few others when lunch was served. Before lunch, however, the two senators, Richard Holbrooke and I sat in a corner for a quiet chat. They said that they were coming from India and there was a feeling of complete outrage and that something needed to be done to release the pressure (I assumed on the Government of India). They said unless some dramatic action was taken, all the good work that had been done during our tenure on Pakistan-India peace process will be wasted. I was waiting for the punch line and it didn’t take long to come. To my consternation, Senator McCain wanted to know from me, in view of my experience, both as former Foreign Minister and as a politician, what the reaction of the Pakistan Army and the public at large would be, if there was a limited air raid on Muridke, the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and its political wing, Jamaatud Dawaah (JUD). The Indians strongly believed that the JUD on orders of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s leader Hafiz Saeed was responsible for the Mumbai atrocities.
I was horrified at the mere suggestion and said to the two Senators, with Holbrooke keenly listening, that this would result in public outrage. I was certain beyond doubt that the response of the Pakistan Army would be immediate, though measured, and commensurate to the raid at Muridke. I have no doubt in my mind that such a suggestion could not have come without their sounding out people at the highest level in India before their visit to Pakistan. I further told them that they needed to be sensitive to the history of South Asia, and in many instances it is the gut reaction which determines how people act in a given situation. I gave them the example of India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. I said Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was under great pressure from the international community, particularly the Americans, not to respond to India’s nuclear tests. In fact, he was given many incentives, including by President Clinton, to desist from going through with the nuclear tests. I informed them that the common wisdom on the street was ‘ya Nawaz bum pharayga—ya bum usko pharayga’! (either Nawaz will detonate the bomb—if he doesn’t, he will be detonated himself!). I did, however, tell the Senators that since I was out of office, they needed to discuss this matter with somebody currently in power in Islamabad and even better, sound out the Pakistan Army, either directly or through their contacts.I do not know whether they broached the subject or not with anyone in Islamabad.
I have not spoken about this publicly before, because I felt it could have been misinterpreted and have a negative impact on Pak-US relations. I am mentioning it now to underline how quickly things can go horribly wrong and out of control for both the governments if the activities of non-state actors are not strictly curbed.
I did realise that Senator McCain was a Republican and did not represent the elected Democratic Obama Administration. He very well could have been speaking for himself because he was the one who broached the subject while Richard Holbrooke, who did represent the Obama Administration as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, kept quiet for the duration that this idea was being discussed. I think this was probably to provide him with a ‘plausible deniability’ which diplomats often employ. He could always say that he had nothing to do with this idea and that he was merely accompanying senior Congressional leaders.
After the lunch was over, I thought it necessary to immediately ring General Hamid Javed, who had been the liaison between the army and the entire presidency during my tenure, knowing that he will pass on this information not just to General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who was the Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during our time and the Chief of Army Staff at the time of the attacks, but to other relevant people also. I told him about what I was asked, and also that they were coming to Islamabad. If my memory serves me well, I also rang General Kayani directly.
I was genuinely afraid that once an attack, however limited, took place, and once a response, however measured, was given, nobody could predict how the situation would evolve. There was no guarantee that a tit-for-tat response would soothe feelings on either side. Once the media and politicians got into the act, the situation could easily spiral out of control. Elsewhere in the book, I have discussed the Cold Start Doctrine advocated by some in India as a way to neutralise nuclear parity in South Asia, and the thinking among some strategists in Pakistan to develop a battlefield tactical nuclear weapons in response.
Although, bomb blasts have unfortunately continued in Pakistan and India, nothing as catastrophic as the Mumbai blasts have taken place. I have pointed out in another place in the book that non-state actors have caused huge damage to Pakistan itself and that such groups have transnational linkages, as is evident from the happenings in the Middle East. Luckily, the Pakistan Army, under General Raheel Sharif, has taken massive action in North Waziristan where terrorists have been chased out of their safe havens and their infrastructure destroyed.